Introduction
Martin Heidegger's Being and Time has been repeatedly criticized for ignoring the social and ethical dimensions of human existence. After discussing the possibility of an "ethics of individuation" based on passages from The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, I argue that Heidegger is not concerned with developing a social or moral philosophy as such but with the question of how individuation (Vereinzelung), within the horizon of the question of being (Sein), is possible given the predominance of the social and the fallenness of the public sphere. 3 The priority of the question concerning the individuation of Dasein -and its explication through the alterity of uncanniness, facticity, and death in relation to the identity of tradition and the "they" (das Man) -provides a basis for rethinking the significance of the ethical in Being and Time, especially in light of Heidegger's earlier venture of a hermeneutics of facticity and related works of the late 1920s. Insofar as Heidegger unfolds the finitude and facticity of the ethical, as a question to which ethical thinking needs to respond, Heidegger intimates an ethics of facticity. In the conclusion, I consider the implications of such an ethics and responsibility for issues of language and translation in Heidegger's thinking.
Heidegger's reversal of ethics in Being and Time is not done in the name of another ethical position or view, such as egoism, nor for the sake of the unethical. It is instead a performance and staging of the very question of ethics in its facticity. Heidegger interrogates ethics as embodied in tradition and everyday life in order to disclose possibilities that remain hidden in discourses appealing to axioms, principles, values, and virtues. 4 These unnoticed and suppressed possibilities are intimated in Heidegger's discussions of the existential structures of Dasein such as conscience, guilt, solicitude, or concern for others, and care. The coming to freedom and responsibility involved in the individuation of human being-there -with its threefold equiprimordial structure of being-itself, being-with others (Mitsein), and being-amidst things -occurs or is enacted as a response to the facticity of one's own existence, especially as disclosed in the inescapability of one's death.
Ethics and Individuation
In investigating the significance of individuation in Heidegger, we are confronted with the initial problem that it is habitually not seen as an issue at all. Individuation is already self-evident, since we are all already individuals. If it is questioned at all, it is interpreted as the particularization of a universal, the instantiation of a type, differentiation according to a category, and affiliation with or alienation from some 3 I retain "fallenness" as a translation of Verfallenheit, because (1) the word does not mean "falling prey" and (2) Heidegger intentionally transforms reified theological concepts, such as conscience, fallenness, and guilt by phenomenologically relating them to concrete phenomena. 4 My reading departs from interpretations of Heidegger that define ethics in an exclusively limited and negative sense. Gail Stenstad, for instance, suggests that Heidegger's thinking has no ethical dimension and that imputing any ethics would violate "what Heidegger's thinking is trying to accomplish." However, even as she rejects ethics as derivative and useless theorizing, as the opposite of dwelling, she discusses claims that have a broader ethical dimension, such as holding oneself open to what is, listening and responding to things, etc., or that have a tacit ethical dimension insofar as being open, listening to, and dwelling with things suggests an ethos (eqoV), accustomed place, or way of life rather than a secondary ontic fact of human existence. See Transformations: Thinking After Heidegger (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006) , especially 183-185, 197-198. given authority or identity. It is accordingly either reduced to numerical, physical and spatial differentiation or a belonging to a pregiven genus or fixed essence for which "becoming oneself" is a redundant question.
For Heidegger, the question of individuation is an issue concerning not "what" but "who" one is. It is bound up with the enigma of how the self can know itself in its facticity, that is, that which resists the self and its appropriations, including its own self, compelling factical-life to interpret and translate itself. Heidegger described such questions, in which the self questions itself concerning itself and as a whole (GA 29/30, p. 20) , as existential or metaphysical. 5 They disclose myself as a question to myself.
Heidegger's employment of the German word Vereinzelung (individuation) suggests a break or separation involved in "becoming one" or in being reduced onto oneself. Although they need not coincide in ordinary German, Heidegger identifies Vereinzelung with loneliness and solitude (Einsamkeit) in The Fundamental
Concepts of Metaphysics:
This individuation is rather the solitariness in which each human being first of all enters into a nearness to what is essential in all things, a nearness to world. What is this solitude, where each human being will be as though unique? (GA 29/30, p. 8). Why does this individuation, the singularity that is not just a particular instance of the universal in being as though unique, require solitude? In this need, is it nothing but a flight and escapism, such as that attributed to the Daoist hermit, into the illusory tranquility of the rural solitude of some mountain stream or forest path?
Perhaps. Yet more significantly, for Heidegger, solitude is a condition not of escaping the world but of encountering it. Solitariness is a prerequisite of individuation because the latter breaks with the constant noise of normal indifference in order to near and hear the world. Individuation is a kind of transcendence (GA 2, p. 51), a stepping out of oneself toward the world. The break of immanence (transcendence) is necessary for the happening of a "step back from" that is equally a "stepping out into" and allowing to be seen. Solitude, as separation from participation in the continuous hum of everydayness, is the breakdown of connection through encountering finitude. The uniqueness of self and things does not arise from the imposition of a view, prescription or imperative (i.e., "ethics" in the traditional sense) but emerges in the "indicative," self-disclosing moment of "coming into one's own" -which even in his early lecture-courses is not merely an ontic occurrence -of letting world be encountered and said (i.e., "ethics" in a phenomenological sense).
As a response to finitude, including the facticity that one is, individuation is a becoming finite. Since finitude is the way in which humans exist or dwell, it is not a mere "fact" about human nature. Nor is encountering one's own finitude equivalent to idealistically reducing the world to the ego and its concerns, as such egoism is part of the average everydayness that is in question. On the contrary, according to Heidegger: Finitude is not some property that is merely attached to us, but is our fundamental way of being. If we wish to become what we are, we cannot abandon this finitude or deceive ourselves about it, but must safeguard it. Such preservation is the innermost process of our being finite, i.e., it is our innermost becoming finite. Finitude only is in truly becoming finite. In becoming finite, however, there ultimately occurs an individuation of man with respect to his Dasein. Individuation -this does not mean that man clings to his frail little ego that puffs itself up against something or other which it takes to be the world (GA 29/30, p. 8). This taking-up, safeguarding, and preserving of finitude can be seen as an "ethics of finitude." It is not ethics in the standard sense of prescribing universal rules and systems of axioms, values, or virtues to follow, since Heidegger rejected "ethics" as legislation and calculation. Such an ethics is not about the formation of a set of values, world-view, or ideology at all, much less some supposed "spiritual" and "cultural" warfare, but opening up their questionability in exposing the self to its world. The possibility of this ethics should be separated from (while confronting) Heidegger's own "fallen" ideological engagement, which was perhaps due to blindness to the pervasiveness and power of ideology and value thinking.
The early Heidegger's emphasis on the transformative moment -or singularizationof coming into one's own (i.e., in his early usage of words such as Ereignis and Geschehen) and renewal in performative enactment (Vollzug), in contrast with the dominion of custom and opinion that passes things along, allows responding to the world out of its openness and givenness anew. Destructuring is introduced in order to attempt to trace that which throws views, values, and constructs into question in order to let the world, self, and other be encountered. This is not ethics in the conventional sense of legislating laws, moralizing about virtues, or prescribing values. However, it is deeply ethical in that such confrontation engages and potentially releases its own tradition, historicity, hermeneutical situation, and generation. The prospect of such a phenomenological ethics depends on whether individuation, as a break that opens and discloses other possibilities for dwelling, is even thinkable. 
Indifference and Individuation
The orienting issue of Being and Time is the meaning and truth of being. Yet rather than providing a classical philosophical analysis of being, or ontology, Heidegger interrogates the meaning of being via the issue of that being who examines its own way or mode of being. Being and Time asks the question of being but does so by addressing that being which questions itself. He calls this being, which we in each case are, Dasein. Far from being the philosophical anthropology that Husserl feared, much less an encyclopedic or systematic account of human nature, Heidegger's analytic of Dasein focused on a sparse number of aspects of human existence and in an eccentric way from the perspective of modern social philosophy. Heidegger did not begin with the individual as an essence or atomic fact from which to construct society through power, markets, contracts, and convents. His analysis takes as its point of departure Dasein in its "neutrality," in what he calls the "indifference" of everydayness, and proceeds to examine situations that broach the significance of being and the self by placing this indifference in question.
Average everyday life is not indifferent in the Kantian sense of being disinterested or Stoic impartiality. It is not the absolute indifference experienced in profound boredom, unconcerned with all affairs, which Heidegger described in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Instead, through its self-interested concern with everyday things and affairs, it is indifferent to that which would throw light on character and of the plight of its own existence. It is in these situations, where the everyday and the ordinary become questionable, that the grip of everyday indifference is broken. The difference indicated in this breaking, in which the "one" of the "they" (das Man) is doubled into two in order to become the "one" of oneself (vereinzelt) , is the possibility of individuation. Individuation as the break with indifference can take place because Dasein's neutrality is already broken by the facticity of its existence: "The being that we in each case are, the human is in its essence neutral. We call this being Dasein. Yet it belongs to what is ownmost to neutral Dasein that it has a necessarily broken neutrality, insofar as it in each case factically exists" (GA 27, p. 146) [trans. modified].
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The transition from being lost in the facticity of the indifference, conformity, and compulsion of the "they" (das Man) to the self-individuation involved in what Heidegger calls authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) requires that the self can be a question to and for itself precisely in and through its facticity. Heidegger accordingly contends in §9 that the analytic of Dasein cannot begin with Dasein in its difference, qua actually existing concrete individual, but rather with its common indifference or averageness. For Heidegger, Dasein's being "must be developed from the existentiality of its existence. This cannot mean, however, that 'Dasein' is to be construed from out of a concrete possible idea of existence. At the outset of our analysis, it is particularly important that Dasein should not be interpreted in the difference of a definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered in its indifferent character which it is proximally and for the most part. This indifference is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this being" (GA 2, p. 58, emphasis added). Although the goal of the analytic of Dasein will be Dasein in its difference (individuation), its factical possibilities (existence) are not straightforwardly available in average everydayness.
Difference remains invisible to the indifference of the "they."
9 Average ordinary life dwells in the familiarity of its self-understanding without seeing its possibilities or hearing "who" (not "that") it is. The familiarity and compulsion of common life presents itself as certain, obvious, and unquestionable. In this context of conventional hearing, and reading, "we hear only what we already understand."
10 This habitual and customary reproduction of power in our very senses was analyzed by Adorno, in the context of music and -needless to say -from a different perspective, as a retrogression in hearing as listeners are transformed into consumers.
11 Such everyday hearing is all the more coercive, however, because it is not merely superimposed by an external system upon the "innocent" lifeworld, and hence easily correctable through a new consensus, but already comprises the fabric of the everyday lifeworld itself. Although Heidegger was not interested in ideology-critique or prescribing "ownedness" as a normative end or standard, since he rejected ethics and critique in this sense, his thought still has consequences for such thinking given this account of inherent non-innocence of everydayness. Dominion achieved through the public sphere and civil society, through everyday beliefs and practices, is consequently much more unquestioned and pervasive than any hegemony based on institutions alone.
It is repeatedly forgotten that fallenness, according to the logic of temporalization at work in Being and Time, is not so much spatial -fallen from heaven -as it is temporal. Everyday existence is not simply a "social reality" but is itself a mode of being in time, it is fallenness into the present. For fallen everydayness, according to its temporality of existing in the present without encountering the moment, everything is an extension of its own present. Although it understands and lives the past and future as mere extensions of the present, and as guaranteed by history, memorial, and progress, the absolutized perspective of the present is itself historically formed and finite. The Augenblick, the instant or moment, is an encounter with one's own temporal finitude and, as such, potentially a break in which decision and individuation can occur. Yet human existence is not only challenged by its present. Being related to a past that cannot fully be mastered and a future that is not simply a reproduction of its own present, the identity of lifeworld and common sense are 9 Interestingly, the question of naming difference remains deeply problematic for Heidegger. See, for example, Peter Trawny's investigation of the "inappearance" or "invisibility" (Unscheinbarkeit) of difference in Heidegger's thought. Trawny's essay explores the complexity of difference, the multiple ways in which difference is enacted, in Heidegger's thought. Difference is itself no longer difference when it is understood, according to the logic of identity, as a first principle or ground. This presents Heidegger with the impossibility of identifying and naming difference, since difference as difference withdraws and withholds itself. always implicitly questionable. Everyday existence avoids such questionability in its "flight" from this unknown past and unknowable future, because exposure to this temporality, to the ecstatic character of time, throws its self-certainty and selfunderstanding into question.
Dasein is first of all to be understood out of the social indifference in which it is usually affected and moved. Yet, via the very affectivity and motility indicated in the self's average everydayness, Heidegger articulated Dasein's possibilities for understanding being and enacting its existence in its difference and singularity. This is done through the interruption of everyday indifference, which allows the releasement of the everyday. These interruptions occur through experiences of limits, which Karl Jaspers had described as "boundary situations."
12 These disruptions are not merely negative and inconvenient, but disclose the very character of existence in its facticity and possibility. The differentiation of existence occurs through the possibilities disclosed in the breaks and disruptions of everydayness itself. It is difference itself that reveals possibilities for the individuation of Dasein. Although alterity is hinted at in Jaspers's notion of "boundary-situation," it remains inadequate for Heidegger's analysis of individuation insofar as it fails to enact the questionability of existence. As merely other, alterity and difference can always be reintegrated back into the indifference of everydayness, just as there is a kind of "newness" and apparent variety that is actually more of the same in contrast with the phenomenologically new (GA 20, .
Indifferent everydayness involves a repetition without difference and without renewal. The broken hammer can be replaced, anxiety can be forgotten, and the strangeness of the stranger can be integrated or excluded according to the norms of everydayness. Interruption alone cannot individuate the self, but rather how Dasein responds to interruption is the key to its individuation: Whether the break itself is recognized as such and its questionability intensified or whether it is excluded as nonsense -as the "nothing" is habitually disclosed in average existence -or -like death -integrated into the identity of everydayness. The questionability of such experiences and situations needs to be embraced and deepened if radical individuation is to occur. This is why Heidegger emphasized the moment of being pushed and shaken (Stoß) in his description of the call of conscience: "In the disclosive tendency of the call, lies the moment (Moment) of a push (Stoß), of an abrupt arousal (Aufrütteln). The call is from afar unto afar" (GA 2, p. 360). This being called is a being pushed and shaken in the call, since ordinary hearing does not listen to it. Dasein, as being-with others, can listen to others and does so in the manner of everydayness. The average self loses itself in the undifferentiated talk of everydayness such that it hears yet fails to listen. Thus, according to Heidegger, Dasein "fails to hear its own self in listening to the they-self." Lost in this average indifferent hearing, Dasein "fails to hear in that it listens away to the 'they'" (GA 2, p. 360). The call of conscience interrupts ordinary hearing and discloses another possibility for hearing: "This hearing-to [or 'listening away' (Hinhören) to the 'they'] must be broken, i.e., the possibility of another kind of hearing that interrupts it must be given by Dasein itself. The possibility of such a break consists of being called-onto (Angerufen) without mediation" (GA 2, p. 360).
The individuation of Dasein, which is in each case a being with others in the world, is not enacted in the everyday relationship between self and other. This relationship is itself usually characterized by the indifference of everydayness. Instead, this enactment occurs only when the questionability of existence in its being-with is enacted. It is precisely such experiences of interruption and uncanniness that individuate Dasein, when it hears the claim addressed to it in such experiences, and thus lets difference appear (GA 2, 372, (406) (407) . 13 The call of conscience is a call by oneself onto being oneself. As such, it interrupts the identity of everydayness to let singularity, responsiveness to it, and responsibility for it, appear. Angst, however, does not proceed from and back to oneself insofar as it, as possibility, interrupts the very being of the self. Angst individuates in relation to the non-relational that can at any time strike (GA 2, (253) (254) . That is, it singularizes Dasein in regard to the ownmost (eigensten), non-relational (unbezüglichen), and unbeatable (unüberholbaren) possibility of its own death (GA 2, pp. 332-333). The unavoidable possibility of death confronts each thrown existence as its own death, as a death that addresses "me" by ending and thus radically placing into the question the very mineness of my existence. This possibility is nonrelational in that it cannot be ordered in the relationality of the world but places relationality itself into question. Death is not another relation; it appears as the relationless as such. Death appears as something that cannot be "outstripped" or "beaten."
Dasein runs in after or away from death, yet it does not overcome the death it is expecting or avoid the death it is fleeing. Rather than being something Dasein can master, death masters Dasein each time. Death remains in its difference something that cannot be sublimated (unaufhebbar), mediated (unvermittelbar), and thought relationally (unbezüglich; GA 2, pp. 332-333).
14 It indicates the fundamental thrownness into facticity of Dasein, and the limits of "transcendental-horizonal thinking," which is an issue that Heidegger continues to return to and rethink in the Contributions to Philosophy.
15 Dasein is incapable of conceptualizing or mastering 13 The intersection of familiarity and unfamiliarity (proximity and distance) is already a topic in 1919. The disruption of the familiar presupposes the stability of the familiar that is thrown into question. death, since death withdraws from being understood (GA 2, pp. 332-333). It is in this sense that the death of the other cannot be represented (GA 2, pp. 319-321). For Heidegger, it is only in the shadow of one's own death in which this nonrelationality occurs and the nexus of worldly significance is broken. At first, it seemed that average everydayness had the first and last word, and that interruptions could always be reappropriated and integrated back into the same. Yet, with the disclosure of fundamental non-relationality in anxiety, the direction of Heidegger's analysis is reversed. It is not uncanniness and questionability that are derivatives of everydayness; it is everydayness that presupposes the uncanniness and questionability that it suppresses: "That kind of being-in-the-world which is tranquilized and familiar is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point of view, the 'not-at-home' must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon" (GA 2, p. 252). Heidegger would insist on the fundamental homelessness of "man" almost 10 years later in his Contributions to Philosophy: "Be-ing is the hearth-fire in the midst of the abode of the gods -an abode which is simultaneously the estranging of man (the 'between' [das Zwischen] in which he remains a (the) stranger, precisely when he is at home with beings)" [GA 65, . 16 Existence is primordially strange and foreign, we do not even know what "man" -or "the human" -is (GA 29/30, p.10), and we remain strangers to ourselves (GA 29/30, p. 6). It is not the identity and indifference of everydayness that is primary. Singularity and difference are constitutive of Dasein through its openness as well as its uncanniness and questionability. The self is each time a question to itself.
Dasein and Its Other
Levinas criticized the primacy of one's own death in Heidegger and proposed an alternative approach in which the death of the other always takes precedence.
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Is there not after all a testimony of/to the other in her death, one that suggests the ethical relation to the other rather than absorption in the egoism of self-concern? One could even formulate Levinas's point in a way such as to alleviate some "Heideggerian" concerns: Could there not be a testimony to the other that is outside of the conceptuality and relationality of representational thinking; could there be a witnessing that does not undermine the non-relationality and non-identity of the other's death as in each case its own? This last question raises the point of Heidegger's reference to Tolstoy: "In his story 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich' Leo Tolstoy has presented the phenomenon of the disruption and breakdown of having someone die" (GA 2, p. 338n). A simple statement, yet one that indicates that testimony and witnessing are not necessarily the average everyday response to the death of the other, although they can occur through the disruption and breakdown.
The "ownmost" of death is not possessiveness and its "mineness" is not egoism, since possessiveness and mineness indicate that they are questions for oneself (myself) that place oneself (me) into question and not some other person somewhere else. Perhaps, following the structure of care, one needs to see one's own death in order to care for the other's death, since this breaks the uncaring indifference of everydayness that does not care for the self or the other. In that sense, it is more than the recognition of not being able to live the other's death. Death places me into question, addresses me as a question, precisely by being my death. If death escapes representation and relationality, the other's death can be a question for me although I do not experience or live-through what it was like for her from her perspective. This is because death is a limit to experience rather than some content that could be reproduced from one mind to another. It is mine in that it occurs to every "I" each time alone. It is not mine in the sense of a possession that I control since it controls me. Dasein does not possess itself in death but is, on the contrary, "shattered" (GA 2, p. 509). Heidegger would transform this claim in his Introduction to Metaphysics, where he described how the human being, who responds to the violence of being through violence, shatters on death (GA 40, p. 167/168), and continues with the claim that the violence-doing of human Dasein "must shatter against the excessive violence of being" (GA 40, p. 171/173) . 18 Heidegger also commented in his Contributions to Philosophy on the role of understanding and its being shattered in Being and Time: "But understanding of being is throughout just the opposite, nay even essentially other than making this understanding dependent upon human intention. How is being still to be made subjective at that place when what counts is the shattering of the subject?" (GA 65, . The self cannot have itself then as a possession or consolidate itself as "the Self," according to Heidegger, since it is already thrown into a world in which it is not the center and in which it is being decentered. Dasein is not only ek-static, it is essentially decentered or "ek-centric" (GA 27, p. 11). Even if Levinas's objection is unconvincing, the problem runs deeper. Dasein is not an identical subject that can only be interrupted by another. Dasein is already distant and foreign to itself, such that the alterity and difference of uncanniness constitute its very mode of being. Dasein is thrown into facticity not as a general self or subject (GA 27, p. 5) but as "each time" (je-weilig) and "in each case its own" (je-meinig). It is therefore one's own death, not the death of the other, which indicates the most radical alterity and singularity. Being-there is in each case "my own" each singular time without sublimation, mediation, or relationality (i.e., Unaufhebbarkeit, Unvermittelbarkeit and Unbezüglichkeit).
19 Death as the most extreme possibility determines the facticity of existence. 20 As facticity, it cannot be overcome or withstood. Dasein is constituted as being outside of itself and outside in a world, existing as thrown beyond itself as ek-static and outside itself as ek-centric (GA 27, p.11), which literally means being out of orbit. The self of Dasein is then both near and distant to itself. This familiar and unfamiliar self occurs in and through everydayness and the individuation of uncanniness. Individuation as Vereinzelung is a singularization through the interruption of the identity of the "they," the opening of the difference that Dasein already is as each time its own. Yet, this singularization of Dasein as thrownness in a specific situation does not necessarily imply isolation if it brings Dasein into the entirety of its relations in the midst of beings (GA 27, p. 334). The separation and solitude of individuation might be isolating but this does not by itself make it egoism or solipsism.
One can describe Being and Time in terms of an inappropriable connectedness, that is, a contextuality that centers, decenters, and recenters human existence. In this relationality, including its "relation" to the non-relational, Dasein is both dependent and free in its relations to things, others, and the world. The relation to the other exemplifies this inappropriable relationality in that Dasein cannot take the place of the other. The other's existence withdraws from appropriation insofar as it is each time and in each case its own. Thus, "I am never the Dasein of the other, although I can be with him." 21 For Heidegger, "time is the principle of individuation" and Dasein is its own way of being its time. 22 Dasein is inherently singularizing from the start, since it is its time. It is temporal. It is not only in the moment but is each time its moment. 20 Heidegger already connected facticity and death in 1924. See, for instance, GA 64, p. 51. 21 I cannot be the other but only be with her, this entails that Dasein cannot overcome the asymmetry of self and other. This not due to the "irrationality of lived experience" or "the limitedness and uncertainty of knowledge" but is constitutive of the way of being that Dasein is (GA 64, p. 47). The alterity seen by Levinas in the death of the other does not have the same power for Heidegger. Rather than placing the self into question, the other's death is indifferently reintegrated according to the maxim that "one dies" (GA 64: 49) . However, as in his examination of The Death of Ivan Ilyich, Heidegger's description of such indifference does not entail that he is advocating it. 22 GA 64, pp. 57, 82-83. 23 Compare Frank Schalow's analysis of temporality as diversity and plurality in Heidegger in his article "Decision, Dilemma, Disposition: The Incarnatedness of Ethical Action," Existentia 12/3-4 (2002), especially pp. 249-250. I would argue in addition that this follows Heidegger's early strategy of the formal indication of facticity: Ontological difference opens up the plurality of ontic difference, time the singularity of the moment.
In the relation of Dasein to its other, it can attempt to take this away from the other by leaping in, taking over, "understanding better," or it can promote the other's individuation. Thus, Heidegger indicated a different kind of relation in which the other is to remain free. In solicitude or caring-for (Fürsorge) the other, as ownmost care, Dasein does not leap in for the other in order to take the other's care away, but rather is affected by it in order to give it back to the other. Caring for the other in its "care" does not imply taking the other's care away (abzunehmen), but instead means to overtake it (übernehmen) in order to return it (zurückzugeben). Insofar as Dasein leaps ahead for the other instead of leaping in, it does so for the sake of the other rather than for itself. It takes up the other not to appropriate her but precisely in order to bring her to her own being as care. Solicitude or caring for the other's care is not the reduction of my responsibility to promoting the responsibility of the other instead of, for example, helping someone in genuine need. It is more than the moral minimalism of abstract individualism insofar as it indicates the possibility of a reciprocal individuation in which each has its own being, as freedom and care, promoted.
Individuation involves differentiating oneself from common life -in its averageness and fallenness -while taking up the responsibility of sharing with the other from out of this difference. This difference is a between that separates and binds, suggesting that individuation cannot be fulfilled. It happens only out of its impossibility. As Heidegger already argued in 1924, fallenness is constitutive of facticity (GA 64, p. 51). As such, it remains inappropriable. If Dasein never overcomes, much less outlasts, its confrontation with its own death, then authenticity can at most only be a modification of facticity: "The ownmost being of Dasein is what it is only insofar as it is unownedly owned, that is, 'preserved' in itself. [Ownedness] is not anything that should or could exist for itself next to the unowned" (GA 64, p. 81). Instead of transcendence being an otherworldly condition or the formation of an isolated sovereign individual, ownedness indicates an altered way of relating to one's unowned everydayness. It is not to "shake off" tradition and everydayness, which is constitutive of the finitude of Dasein and thus inescapable, but to appropriate it more primordially (GA 2, p. 291). Yet, as this appropriation is always related to the inappropriable, transcendence can only be a response to -and taking up of responsibility for -facticity. That is, freedom is taking up one's responsibility in its facticity (GA 64, p. 54) . If responsibility is inevitably each time one's own yet enacted in relations with others, and freedom is a response to facticity (the awakening of possibilities in the facticity that one is), then ethics is always already the ethics of facticity.
The "giving back" of care also clarifies the idea of an inappropriable relatedness by revealing a relation in which the other is not mediated by one's own but is promoted precisely as being other than myself: "This solicitude which essentially pertains to authentic care; that is, the existence of the other, and not to a what which it takes care of, helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and free for it" (GA 2, p. 163). Heidegger clarified this "being-for-the-other" further in his 1928/1929 lecture course Introduction to Philosophy. There, he described how the essence of being-with-one-another consists of being-open-for-one-another (Für-einander-offenbar-sein), an openness for the other that allows reciprocity and its lack to be possible (GA 27, p. 88). As Heidegger later maintained, understanding (verstehen) is not an indifferent mutuality but a reciprocal placing into question. Understanding is not an encounter between two fixed positions that somehow remain unchanged in their communication, or concludes in conversion, but is differentiation through addressing and questioning both oneself and the other out of care (GA 13, pp. 17, 20) . 24 Understanding is enacted through a confrontation and conflict in which the other places one's own in question, and vice versa, transforming those who engage in it (GA 13, p. 20) . Understanding thus requires both (1) the long lasting will of listening to the other and (2) the courage to one's own determination (GA 13, p. 21).
The Being-with of Dasein
Levinas and others have criticized Heidegger for subjectivism and individualism and argued that Heidegger's thought is inherently unable to think the social and ethical. 25 In response, I have argued that Heidegger's work hints at an "ethics of facticity" or finitude in proceeding from an indifferent commonality to the possibility of individuation through the difference in/of experience itself. This individuation requires the unfolding of what Heidegger describes as conscience, freedom, and responsibility. Although Heidegger rejected the terms "ethics" for various historical reasons, it is clear that his project has an ethical dimension and significance. In addition, rather than excluding sociality, his account of individuation shows how it is uniquely possible as free from domination (i.e., taking the other over) and as promoting the other's Dasein as care, freedom, and responsibility.
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One should not forget that Dasein is "always already" being-with and that beingwith is a fundamental equiprimordial determination of the being of Dasein. The "with" occurs not because of identity or because Dasein is made alike but rather because of the "there" (GA 27, p. 137). Dasein encounters others and things in how they give themselves because it is the opening of the there (GA 27, p. 136). Because being-there is being-with, being-with cannot be derived from the idea of the subject 24 Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910 -1976 ), GA 13 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983 . 25 Levinas interprets Dasein as a fundamentally non-intersubjective subjectivity. See Bernhard Waldenfels, Phänomenologie in Frankreich, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), p. 236. 26 The owned (eigentliche) is related back to one's own (eigene). Ownedness had an explicitly social as well as temporal dimension in the early1920s, since the relation to "one's own" means opening up the possibilities available to one to individuate oneself "in one's own time and generation" (PIA, p. 248): Heidegger, "Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)," H.U. Lessing (ed.), Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 6 (1989): 237-69. (GA 27, p. 133), nor the self from the other (GA 27, p. 135), nor in the "I/you" relation that simply doubles the solipsistic subject (GA 27, pp. 141, 146) . Sociality and community, and every form of "I/you" relation, are only possible because Dasein is each time in its own way already with others and is, as such, a being-with-others (GA 27, p. 141). Insofar as being-there is being-with-others, Dasein is always already spoken to and addressed by the other (GA 29/30, p. 301) . The self, insofar as it listens to and hearkens to the other, is always already placed into question by the other and pulled out toward responsibility for the other in care: Care as care for the self inherently is bound to the care for the other. As owned, Dasein cannot step in, take over, and occupy its place but can only promote the other's self-care. The answer, the binding responsibility that brings Dasein to choice and decision (WDF, p. 169), is care.
27 Care discloses the difference of the average being-with of Dasein and the ownmost possibility of being-with, in which Dasein first stands in relations directed toward others.
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The question of community and individuation is not then a question of inferring a collective subject from an individual one or of deducing the individual from the collective. It is neither about an ahistorical and worldless self nor a social organism that allows no difference. 29 Heidegger had already suggested this in his Winter semester 1921-1922 lecture course, when he made the case that the self-world is neither identical to the ego nor can it be isolated from being-with and the environing world (GA 61, p. 96) . 30 The question of being-with cannot be one of the phenomenological constitution or construction of being-with from out of one's own self considered as an isolated ego or subject (GA 29/30, p. 302). Insofar as being-with is to be understood as a structure of everydayness, it too must be transformed in the modification of everydayness that occurs through individuation. Dasein is in each case my own such that I am never the Dasein of the other but only with the other. Consequently, Dasein never becomes the other but is rather individuated in such a way that in becoming itself, it becomes otherwise than itself and in becoming otherwise than itself singularly becomes itself. Individuation is not a closed isolated process such that the nearness to the "they" would be lost. Dasein cannot comport itself as being-with without listening to the "they" and without cultivating its ability 27 WDF: Heidegger, "Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung. 10 Vorträge." Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 8 (1992- van Buren, 1994: 324-347 . 29 Heidegger not only rejected the idea of a "worldless 'I'" but also would later criticize the more dangerous shapes in which this worldless subject is absorbed into "something greater," such as life or the Volk (GA 65, p. 321/225; also compare IM: 54/74). 30 Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, GA 61 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994). to hear beyond what is usually and for the most part said in order to achieve a responsive hearing that takes into consideration a being-with the other that is also a being-for the other (GA 2, pp. 163, 217). Responsiveness thus implies responsibility, and, yet, it cannot occur without the confrontation and conflict with the other for the other (GA 27, 327) .
Being-with others and the Responsiveness of Hearing
Following the interpretation staked out in the previous sections of this paper, Heidegger did not turn to the question of the self or self-sameness to the exclusion of the other as well as the alterity of the world and one's own self. The individuation of Dasein in its being-with unfolds through hearing. This does not occur as a process of identification or empathy, but rather it only occurs through differentiation and becoming other. All understanding is therefore in this sense differentiating confrontation (Auseinandersetzung). Dasein transforms itself in its being-with precisely through the responsibility for the other in encountering and individuating the other. Individuation signifies more than recognition of difference and alterity. Individuation and differentiation occur not as a progressive teleological development but through one's own questionability and uncanniness. Heidegger's thinking is thus a questioninganswering responsiveness in relation to the facticity of the thrownness of Dasein. The historicity of thrownness into one's own generation and world signifies the impossibility of a pure responsiveness that would occur without interruption and conflict, without the historicity and destiny in which Dasein finds itself. This implies that Dasein cannot recognize another, and by implication translate, without differentiating itself and its other. Difference occurs not as indifferent lack of contact and isolation but rather, as a turning of language through the word, as and in the crossing of the between.
Dasein is frequently referred to by Heidegger as an originary unified phenomenon, but this unity belongs to difference itself. For example, in the late 1920s, Heidegger described it as the transcendence of Dasein in its nothingness and lack of bearing (GA 27, p. 354) . Dasein is thus in each case already betrayed and endangered in its transcendence-in-the-world (GA 27, p. 358) . It belongs to "the each time of the facticity of transcendence" (GA 27, p. 367). As such, humans do not first of all observe and inquire. Human Dasein understands others and "intuits the world" through encounter and confrontation (GA 27, (382) (383) (384) (385) (386) (387) (388) (389) (390) . Ontological difference is not the monistic closure but opens up the radical diversity of ontic differences in being its formal indication, which is not only a phenomenology of phenomena but a hermeneutics of reading, interpreting, and translating texts. The hermeneutic circle in its openness and deferral is already explicated as a movement of translation in Dilthey, for whom transposition between self and other operates as translation and retranslation.
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More radically, ownedness is not a psychological category in Heidegger. The authenticity of existence, as a communicative enowning, is only possible as addressing and being addressed, hearing and responding; that is, as a responsive hearing of the other. Heidegger therefore claims in Being and Time that "Listening to … is the existential being-open of Dasein as being-with for the other. Hearing even constitutes the primary and resolute openness of Dasein for its ownmost possibility of being, as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears because it understands. As being-in-the-world that understands, with others, it 'listens to' (hörig) itself and Mitdasein, and in this listening (Hörigkeit) belongs (zugehörig)" to these (GA 2, p. 217). Listening to others is a belonging to them. Yet, there could be no belonging as listening without difference, since otherwise nothing would need to be said or communicated. The necessity of language is based in the non-identity of its participants. Since Dasein listens to Mitdasein (the being there of the other in all of its facticity and possibility) in addition to itself, it cannot simply be a listening to oneself. Despite the fragmentary character of Being and Time and the undeveloped character of Mitsein, being-with as constitutive of Dasein's existence is repeatedly implied.
Human existence always already belongs to others; it is already with others in the world as a common significant with-world, out of which it understands and acts. Hearing and listening inform and attune a comportment that is directed toward the other, insofar as Dasein is open for the world in standing out in the world, that is, is ecstatic (GA 2, p. 218). This means that the question is not whether but how we go along with and do not go along with others, and how the alterity of the other can be recognized. Heidegger answers this question by pointing toward the possibility of genuine hearing. This hearing and hearkening indicate the passivity of a letting occur. Both are necessary conditions for a responsive relation with the other. This problematic will be transformed through what Heidegger calls the "turning in enowning" (die Kehre im Ereignis) [GA 65, p. 407/286] . The listening confrontation occurs out of the "between" (Zwischen) and the place (Ort) of de-cision (Ent-scheidung), as the answer and question concerning the violence and uncanniness of the human. Heidegger explored in his Introduction to Metaphysics this nexus of address and conflict, of logos (lógoV) and polemos (pól∈moV). More acutely, later in the decade, Heidegger thinks enowning (Ereignis) beyond agon (άgώn) and polemos (pól∈moV), as the primordial difference (Austrag) and strife enacted between gods and humans, world and earth. 33 Heidegger addressed in "Wege zur Aussprache" the possibility of interpretive confrontation (verstehende Auseinandersetzung). Heidegger is concerned here with a recognition of the other, which does not forget the question of difference between self and other. This is understood as a conflict (Streit), not for the sake of strife -much less for the so-called "struggle for existence" -but for understanding the other (GA 13, . 34 This is because difference (Unter-schied) is announced in hearing. 35 For Heidegger, "we can truly hear only when we are hearkening" (GA 40, p. 138) . We can only hearken when we are responsive to what is said. Responding, however, is something barely heard in the word "correspondence" (GA 40, p. 132) . Correspondence, and accordingly translation as a co-responding, calls for being thought from out of the context of being claimed and responding to that claim. In this sense, Heidegger is articulating another fundamentally different kind of hearing that would be responsive to word and thing. But, to tweak a statement of Heidegger, we are not simply inexperienced in such hearing; our ears are overcome by what prevents responsive hearing and interpretive confrontation (GA 40, p. 138) .
Listening and Difference
Wenn keiner mehr wirklich reden kann, dann kann gewiß keiner mehr zuhören.-T. W. Adorno 36 Verständigung im eigentlichem Sinne ist der überlegene Mut zur Anerkennung des je Eigenen des anderen aus einer übergreifenden Notwendigkeit.-Martin Heidegger (GA 13, p. 16).
Heidegger explicated the possibilities of the self's being responsive to others, the world, and itself. This complicates the question of the relationship between Heidegger's philosophy and his involvement in National Socialism, because the quick explanations of this seem inadequate to his thought and his action. In this sense, the critiques of Habermas and Levinas have failed to meet the challenge and complexity of the question. Heidegger had already in his early and later work placed the philosophy of identity and totality radically into question. Ontology, which is always the destructuring of ontology for Heidegger, is to be understood from out of its difference, that is, the ontological difference between beings and being, and as the openness. But despite Heidegger's use of this language, perhaps he did not go far enough since he did not develop the ethical import of this difference and openness. If we consider Levinas' alternative to Heidegger's thought, rather than his criticism, the question emerges of why Heidegger did not take the step from responsiveness to the primacy of ethical responsiveness to the other. Is it then this ethical unthought that remains the questionability of his political activity in the 1930s?
Heidegger's thinking, beginning in the mid-1930s, if only as an unsaid to be said, already bears the mark and trace of a confrontation with National Socialism, and thus with his own philosophy. The critique of modernity and the history of the West that began to emerge in the mid-1930s is not without its ethical and political implications. 37 In his later thought, the themes we have considered in his work of the 1920s will only become more pronounced: Heidegger himself will undertake the critiques of identity and presence that were later used to destructure his own thought. Yet, the question of difference is in Heidegger's thinking also a question of the interdependence of the intercrossing and the between, a thinking from out of and to the middle that resists dialectic -which in resisting it cannot escape -and a mere opposition of identity and difference. Heidegger argued in "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics" that the thinking of difference as difference and the "step back," as opposed to recollection, characterizes his thought in contrast with Hegel's. However, one can never completely escape the dialectic, and difference as difference always withdraws from being sayable and thinkable. As such, the thinking of difference as difference cannot escape the metaphysics of identity that it confronts. There is then no simple overcoming of metaphysics in which philosophy ends and thinking begins. 38 Heidegger's ontology, as the simultaneous critique and demystification of traditional ontology, signifies then the fundamental openness of being. Being is the opening of the between, the intersecting fourfold, and the openness of being is a claiming and being claimed of human life, that is, be-ing is that which essentially addresses and attunes our being in its fundamental capacity to hear. The forgottenness (Vergessenheit) of this inapparent and withdrawing difference, that is, of difference as difference, belongs to difference itself (GA 11, p. 55) . Difference can then not be used as a first principle or explanatory ground, since difference itself undermines these as difference. This questioning of being from out of the openness of be-ing occurs through the intercrossing of the between as responsive setting-apart and interpretive conflict, which cannot be mediated or sublimated. This conflict is neither negative nor subjective; it is not for Heidegger an agon (άgώn) of individuals nor the self-assertion of the will. According to the early Heidegger, the world is encountered in the communicative enowning of logos (lógoV), in addressing and being addressed; "The world is always encountered in a specific way of being addressed, in being claimed (lógoV)" (PIA, p. 241). Addressed and responding to this being claimed, Auseinandersetzung and Widerstreit occur through the world and the questioning that are constitutive for the understanding and attuned comportment that is Dasein.
Concluding Words: Ethics and Translation
For the early Heidegger, logos (lógoV) means legein (lέg∈in), to speak, and speaking "is what most basically constitutes human Dasein"; speech, listening to Aristotle, "is a mode of the being of life" (GA 19, . In his early lecture courses, Heidegger thinks existence as coming into one's own in and through lógoV, in which lógoV is responsive enactment and letting be of phenomena instead of a universal category or identity that subsumes all particulars. 39 This enowning of language, of intersection and transversal allows difference and thus the performative need for translation to appear. Difference shows the fundamental questionability of communicative existence, which is both itself and not itself, and thus calls for interpretation and translation. 40 Since difference indicates the ownmost interruption and placing into question of one's own, translation is a response to both the other's and one's own foreignness. 41 Translation is not then a derivative or secondary use of language added on to a supposed first use of the native tongue. Unfolding within language itself, the task of translation arises from, and resides within "the 'way making' that comes to pass with each 'saying. '" 42 As Parvis Emad notes in "Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation," "translation implies a crossing over and transposition." 43 Translation is a being under way and a way making, as Emad indicates. 44 Or perhaps, to reemploy the language of Heidegger's earliest writings, it is individuation as explored in this paper. Existence is lived as language and logos (lógoV), the en-owning and en-acting of one's own ex-istence through understanding, interpretation, and translation. Entangled amidst things with others in the world, factical existence enacts and articulates its life in dialogue (Zwiesprache). Self-interpretation and self-reflection, individuation and translation, belong to the very facticity of human existence rather than being something alien to or imposed on it. Yet, this translation does not consist in agency, much less in a set of techniques, rules, and prescriptions for going about translating. There is no "ethics of translation" in the sense of assigning norms or standards of correctness to, and then praising or blaming an isolated "Self." Translation does not involve an ethics -in the conventional sense, but instead is a way of safeguarding and preserving the disclosive power of the word into which the speaker is thrown and which individuates itself in one way or another. Responsiveness to and responsibility for the word, which individuates it anew in order to address and encounter its matter, is the challenge of the translator, as Emad indicates so well in addressing the translator's "hermeneutic responsibility." 45 Adopting Emad's description of Heidegger's transformative thinking in Contributions to Philosophy, it can fittingly be said that originary translation "is at the same time a turning of and in language." 46 Translation occurs not only within language, leaving the prevailing structure of language intact, but instead extends to the uttermost limits of what can be said. Responsible translation is, as Emad insists, a "happening of 'de-cision'" within language itself. 47 Such responsible translation, prevailing "in every conversation," is "a response that lets language unfold its core." 48 Herein consists the "originality" of translation. Accordingly, in Emad's words, This means that it is language -and not the interpreter -that initiates, carries through, and completes originary translation. 49 
